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During the last 25 years, the economy 
of the Baltic States has been developing in 
the conditions of sovereignty, both de facto 
and de jure. This period has been sufficient 
to identify regular patterns in the national 
economic models. Studies into the nature of 
the economic development of the Baltic 
States have a considerable practical and 
scientific significance. On the one hand, the 
three Baltic States are a part of the post-
Soviet space. The nature, success or failures 
of their economies contribute to a more 
accurate assessment of Russia’s deve-
lopment. On the other hand, it is the second 
decade of the Baltic States’ 
EU membership, and the countries’ 
experience is very relevant. The article 
identifies and analyses key characteristics of 
the Baltic States’ economic model. The 
author puts forward a hypothesis on two 
stages of the economic transformation 
undergone by the Baltic States. The first 
stage is characterised by a combination of 
transformation and modernisation whereas 
the second — by transformation accom-
panied by a number of destructive trends in 
the economy. The current economic model 
demonstrates limited stability, partly due to 
deliberately severed economic ties with 
Russia. 
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The transition of Eastern Europe 
and the former USSR republics to a 
new path of economic development re-
sulted from a combination of external 
and internal development factors. The 
only debatable issues were develop-
ment rates, priorities, and strategic 
goals. An increase in the standards of 
living based on sustainable economic 
growth was declared the key economic 
goal. This goal was to be achieved 
through attaining the following objec-
tives: 
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1. Overcoming the crisis that became more pronounced after the society 
had entered the phase of a transitional economy; 
2. Development of market relations and infrastructure, including stock, 
currency, and commodity exchange; deregulation of the market; 
3. Financial and economic stabilisation, achieved, as a rule, through pur-
suing a strict monetary policy aimed at curbing inflation; 
4. Using the state as a mechanism to protect the developing market economy; 
5. Reforms in ownership relations as a basis of the economic system, in-
cluding  restitution and land reform. 
A transformational, or transitional, economy is a special state of an eco-
nomic system, functioning during the period of the society’s transition from 
one established model (system) to another. The central characteristic of this 
system is stable interconnections between elements and subsystems, whose 
composition can change without unbalancing the system. 
A period of transformation is an interval during which a society com-
pletes a radical economic transformation, and the country’s economy reaches 
a qualitatively new state as a result of fundamental reforms in the economic 
system. Transformational economy has features distinguishing it from other 
established systems. From our point of view, the current condition of the 
Baltic States’ economy makes it possible to speak of a completed fundamen-
tal transformation. In our opinion, the transformation of the political system 
had been concluded much earlier. However, the transformation of the politi-
cal system is beyond the scope of this article. 
Another crucial issue is the correlation between transformation and mod-
ernisation. In our opinion, any modernisation is a transformation, but not 
vice versa. When a transformation is successful and it contributes to social 
and economic progress, then it is modernisation. However, transformations 
can also result in the degradation of the economic system, which was the 
case in some post-Soviet countries. 
As to the economic systems of the Baltic States, they do not only devel-
oped under the slogans of transformation and modernisation, but also aspired 
for the so-called Westernisation. The denial of national historical and eco-
nomic experience in the republics (states) of the Baltics can be explained by 
the victory of propaganda used by scholars and politicians arguing that pros-
perity could never been attained without complete Westernisation. Authori-
tarianism and totalitarianism, ideologies and practices of communism and 
Nazism are considered as tragic deviations from the bright way to civilisa-
tion achieved through Westernisation. Denying Westernisation took a lot of 
forms, including euroscepticism and was generally frowned upon. Only in 
2015, a landmark event took place: the introduction of migration quotas by 
Brussels provoked a large-scale discussion about rights and obligations in 
the European Union. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Versions of modernisation theories used in the Baltic States suggested 
a rapid and effective breakthrough to a Euro-Atlantic economic system 
based on the concepts of Postmodernism and Neoliberalism. However, 
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‘neither the postmodernist, nor neomodernist (including ethnicity-based 
neomodernism) theories explain complications associated with and dis-
tinctive features of the objectives faced by these countries. They do not 
take into account the countries’ specific features when describing their 
prospects. Nor do they make it possible to manage changes in these coun-
tries’ [1, p. 13]. The Baltics’ political elites are still developing. The the-
sis ‘there is only one way to manage a contemporary economy’ [2, 
p. 118] was most actively promoted in Eastern Europe, especially in the 
Baltics. That is how the era of transformations began. At the same time, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania ignored a well-known fact: modernisation 
projects can entail degradation of traditional institutions and traditional 
national values. The situation started to change after 2009, whereas de-
bates as to whether eurointegration is an unquestionable good began 
much later — in 2015 [3; 4]. 
In the Baltic States, the idea of a breakthrough towards the global and 
European economy developed in the conditions, when the society was split 
along ethnic and political lines. Extremely isolated elites strived to remain in 
power without offering an economic action plan. On the other hand, the So-
viet regime paradoxically contributed to the formation of both a new elite 
and national economic interests in the Baltics. Without focusing on the Bal-
tic problem, Mancur Olson writes that conquerors1 tend to sweep away ac-
cumulated narrow interests, leaving the field free for encompassing interests, 
i. e. there are ‘superencompassing interests that do not comprise the whole 
society … that would lose from redistributing income from the minority to 
themselves’ [5, p. 22]. According to the declared ideology, the Soviet party 
elite became representatives of ‘superencompassing interests’ through regu-
lating production and consumption and ensuring economic and social stabil-
ity. There is also the aspect of economic psychology. The ‘demonstration ef-
fect’ of Western standards of living substantially exceeding those of Eastern 
Europe, was evident. It is also worth noting that, 25 years ago, a significant 
part of the Baltic societies was ready to pay the economic price for inde-
pendence. This was one of the key features of the regional transformational 
model. 
When analysing Russian and European approaches to the problem of 
transformational development, one cannot but admit that most works of 
Russian political scientists dedicated to post-Soviet transformations of 
political regimes have an apparent ideological anchor. Political priorities 
are also of great importance in discussing transformation processes in the 
Baltics. However, we believe that the transformational economy in the 
Baltics had a number of major characteristics, which will be considered 
in detail below. 
                                                     
1 The author would like to ask the reader not to consider this quotation as agreement 
with the concept of ‘occupation’ underlying the political and economic model of the 
Baltic States. In our opinion, it is more correct to speak of Sovietisation in the case 
of the Soviet Baltic republics. 
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1. The influence of the historical background 
 
It is important to address the key features of the Baltics’ current econom-
ic model. One should identify the basic factors affecting the development of 
Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian economies in the past and present. The 
Baltics’ development is affected by the experience of certain historical peri-
ods. Their economy still shows traces of the agricultural model of imperial 
periods and the large infrastructure projects implemented in the Soviet times. 
Their socioeconomic development in the 1920—1920s and over the past 
25 years followed several different scenarios. Despite all the problems, in the 
beginning of the XX century, the development was multidirectional and ori-
ented to both western and eastern markets. A unidirectional model of West-
ern integration is being implemented today. 
In the early 1990s, the Baltic States demonstrated very similar models of 
economic development. In the Baltic Soviet republics, the vision of forth-
coming reforms was based on nostalgic — and thus not always accurate — 
memories of the ‘first republics’ and the concepts of regional economic ac-
counting. 
The mythological perception of economic history became an important 
component of denying the present. 
On the verge of Perestroika in 1986, the fixed assets value rate was 
5,875 roubles per capita in the USSR. This rate differed significantly be-
tween republics — from 8,007 roubles in Estonia, 6,923 in Latvia, and 
6,111 in Lithuania to 5,500 in Belarus, 4,500 in Moldova, 3,823 in Azerbai-
jan, and 2,291 in Tajikistan. 
The growing differences in salaries were even more conspicuous. In 
1940, the difference in the salaries of civil servants and workers was 10 rou-
bles, in 1960—21 roubles, in 1960—33, and in 1988—78. In agriculture, the 
contrast was rather striking — 74 roubles in 1970 and 159 roubles in 1989 
[6, p. 39]. It is not hard to guess that the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian 
SSRs ranked top. Moreover, Soviet Estonia outperformed Latvia and Lithu-
ania in these and other indicators. In 2015, the situation remained the same. 
Reconstruction and industrial development were high on the Soviet priority 
list in the Baltic States for a number of economic and political reasons. From a 
pragmatic viewpoint, Latvia and Estonia represented a skilled-labour reserve un-
like any other republic in the Soviet Union. They also had a very substantial in-
frastructure, which had not been destroyed during the war [7, p. 104]. 
By the 1990s, the Baltic States’ proportion of population with an income 
of over 300 roubles was the highest in the USSR. If the Union-average pro-
portion was 8.8 %, it was 19.8% in Estonia, 14.5 % in Latvia, and 13.8 % in 
Lithuania. The poverty rate was the lowest in the Baltic republics. The pro-
portion of population with an income below 75 roubles did not exceed 1 % in 
Estonia and Latvia, and 1.2 % in Lithuania. Republics with the highest pov-
erty rate in the USSR showed the highest level of autocracy in the post-So-
viet period [8]. 
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Receiving the highest return on investment, the federal authorities decid-
ed to build new production facilities in the Baltics. The republics developed 
production faster than other regions. The proportion of fixed assets in the 
Baltics was above the Union-average and the equipment was more modern 
and less depreciated. This also held true for the agricultural industry. Latvi-
an, Lithuanian, and Estonian kolkhozes and sovkhozes enjoyed privileges 
when distributing fertilisers, equipment, fodder, cattle breeds purchased 
abroad, etc. 
Annual subsidies to agriculture reached tens of billions of dollars, re-
ceived from oil exports from the USSR. For instance, milk was bought from 
kolkhozes and individual farmers for 55 kopeks per litre and sold for 22 ko-
peks per litre in shops. The same held true for meat and other agricultural 
produce. It is easy to imagine the scale of this public subsidy. The independ-
ent Latvian state did not have a comparable financial source [9]. 
It is evident that the initial economic achievements of the Baltics were 
to a great degree — but not completely — accounted for by the ‘Soviet 
heritage’, i. e. infrastructural and industrial potential and the quality of hu-
man capital. 
The thesis about the significance of the Soviet heritage for the eco-
nomic development was formulated as early as 1991 [10]. It was developed 
in a series of works [11; 12]. Let us quote a team of authors led by 
L. M. Grigoryev: 
The Baltics had the best initial conditions among ex-Soviet republics for 
building a market economy. They had developed a significant innovative po-
tential. In the Soviet period, the region served as a ‘laboratory’ for improving 
economic mechanisms. The Baltics always enjoyed a special status in the 
USSR, which suggested significant investment in the region’s development. In 
the 1970—80s, the republics boasted the highest investment per capita rate. 
In effect, Estonia ranked first in the USSR as to this indicator outper-
forming the Union-average by 6—8 %. Technically, the leader was the 
RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), but the republic ac-
counted for most of investment in defence and security, without which Esto-
nia exceeded the Union-average by 15 %). Investment in Lithuania was tra-
ditionally high, whereas that in the Lithuanian economy increased in the late 
1980s [13, p. 55]. 
In the Baltic States, the formation of market economy was affected by a 
number of factors: foundations of market economy that existed before the 
transition to the administrative command economy, economic and historical 
ties with Western Europe, a relatively balanced structure of the national 
economy, and a consensus over the need for a market transition. 
In Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, numerous reforms were launched in 
1991—1992. As early as in 1989—1990, there was an understanding of the 
necessity and inevitability of reforms, which became a consolidating factor 
for the society. The general nature of reforms was apparent — the dena-
tionalisation of the economy in accordance with the new territorial frame-
work. A number of major reforms — monetary, housing and utility, medi-
cal, and municipal — were promptly carried out. They were put in place or 
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launched until 1993. The entrepreneurial skills of the Baltic population and 
assistance from the West contributed to a swift overcoming of the crisis 
caused by the severance of economic ties within the so-called national 
economic complex of the USSR. It is only logical that it was decided to re-
orient the economy to the West. However, at first, leaders of the Baltic So-
viet republics and, later, independent Baltic State were very cautious when 
discussing the prospects of economic development and stressed the need to 
retain economic ties with Russia. 
The understanding of limitations associated with the countries’ orienta-
tion to the West will come later. In the early 1990s, the major Baltic facili-
ties were purchased by Western partners at knockdown prices. The situa-
tion of the 1920s repeated itself, when Scandinavian and later German 
bankers started buying up Baltic assets. In both the 1920s and 1990s, the 
Baltics’ authorities did not realise the actual cost of the property sold and 
destroyed. The understanding came much later, when there was nothing 
left to redistribute. 
It took the first decade of the Baltics’ second independence to realise the 
actual cost of their national treasures. Matti Maasikas, Estonia’s Deputy Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, gave the following assessment of the Soviet legacy: 
We chose the most radical of the possible variants of economic reforms. 
The political forces that came to power in 1992 campaigned under the slogan 
‘clean house’. They believed that the Soviet economy did not leave Estonia 
anything worth using. Everything has to be reconstructed or built anew, and 
everything has to be done rapidly and decisively [14, p. 15]. 
However, only transit, transportation, and trade with Russia accounted 
for almost half of GDP. Today, the assessments of the economic potential of 
the Soviet republics have changed. However, this discussion still remains 
purely academic. 
 
2. Volatility of key economic processes 
 
Most economists coming from different schools of thought stress that 
rapid growth is an equally reliable indicator of serious structural and finan-
cial disproportions in national economies as is rapid decline. This thesis does 
not hold true for the initial period of reforms and transformations in national 
economies. The economic decline in the Baltics was very dramatic: -35 % in 
Estonia, -49 % in Lithuania, and -52 % in Latvia. This situation was observed 
everywhere from Kazakhstan to the Czech Republic. It was also predictable 
that Estonia would be the first country to overcome the crisis. In 2001, it 
reached the pre-crisis 1989 level. At the beginning of 2008, the country’s 
GDP constituted 158 % of that level. The economic achievements of Latvia 
and Lithuania are much more modest — 115 and 111 % respectively [13, 
p. 53]. However, the 2008 crisis led to a new phase of destabilisation. In 
2007—2009, the 10 % GDP growth was replaced by a 19 % decline. Until 
today, the economy remains unpredictable and economic forecasts highly 
volatile [15]. In this context, the 2008 forecast of a 5.6 % growth in the Esto-
nian economy in 2009 seems to be extremely politicised and unscientific. 
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Let us consider GDP per capita in the Baltics in 2006 and 2007. In Lat-
via, it increased by over 33 %. How did it happen? ‘After ten years of pros-
perity brought by the construction boom, cheap production, and Russian 
transit, today, Lithuania needs new sources of income’ [16]. Similar ideas 
are promoted in Estonia. The analysis of the largest Scandinavian financial 
groups — Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) — Ruta Arumäe inter-
prets the economic decline as a large-scale phenomenon. Therefore, its ad-
verse effect on consumers is just a question of time. The situation could be 
remedied by the acceleration of external demand. Yet, there are no signs of 
such acceleration [17]. 
All factors contributing to a large-scale crisis can be divided into two 
groups. The first group is external factors — the balance of payment deficit, 
uncontrolled capital inflow, disregard of exchange risks, and real estate 
‘bubbles’. Although these factors are rather important, they do not exhaust 
the list, otherwise the economic decline would be at the level of other coun-
tries (the decline in the region under consideration is rather dramatic). 
The second group brings together national practices. Trying to clear the 
way for private enterprises, the Estonian government opted for maximum 
liberalisation — absolute deregulation, abolition of subsidies to any compa-
nies that proved to be inefficient in 1991, and rejection of the progressive tax 
rate. As a result, the emerging private sector was booming. 15,000 new 
companies were registered each year (and a comparable number of corporate 
entities went bankrupt). 
The macro-target was eurointegration at any cost, accompanied by unidi-
rectional foreign economic orientation of the Baltics to EU partners and ig-
noring the economic opportunities associated with east European partners. 
Eurointegration was also connected with political deindustrialisation, de-
agrarianisation of the economy, and transferring the control over funding to 
Scandinavian banks. 
In the first decade, such policy brought positive results. However, inter-
national — including Russian — experts have stressed an increase in the cri-
sis trends at least since mid-2007. In the late 2007, the instability in global 
financial markets grew, the banking sector was experiencing problems, and 
specialists spoke of a possible deceleration of global economic growth. The-
se processes developed in the conditions of globalisation, when changes ob-
served in periphery markets could undermine global stability. That is why 
dealing with negative trends and their consequences in such major sectors of 
economy of developed countries as stock markets and banking required co-
ordinated actions of their ‘monetary’ authorities. In the post-Soviet space, 
the crisis first affected Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (in this very order). 
The accelerated integration, which was not based on actual economic 
achievements, could not last forever. 
Even the complete failure of this policy did not lead to a revision of 
practices in 1991—2008. Instead, another book ignoring the economic reali-
ty was published [18]. During the crisis, the economy of the Baltic region 
fell by 20 %.  However, in 2011, the Baltic States showed the highest growth 
rate of 6.3 %. 
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The decline in all economic indicators necessitated a revision of eco-
nomic forecasts for the Baltics. Danske Bank expected the economy of Esto-
nia to increase by 1.5 % in 2014 and 1.8 % in 2015, the economy of Estonia 
— by 3.7 % in 2014 and 2.6 % in 2015, and that of Lithuania — by 2.4 and 
2.7 % respectively [19]. 
Let us consider the case of Latvia. The 2015 budget was drafted based 
on the assumption that next year GDP would increase by 2.8 % and the infla-
tion rate of 2.4 % [20]. However, the stability programme for 2015—2018 
adopted by the Latvian government expected a 2.1 % increase in the Latvian 
economy in 2015. According to Brussels, the country’s GDP had to increase 
by only 2.6 % (2014). At the end of April 2015, the Bank of Latvia predicted 
a 2 % GDP growth [21]. Moreover, the European Commission also revised 
its forecast for Latvia’s economic development. In spring, Brussels predicat-
ed a 3.8 % economic growth.  And in six months, the economic forecast for 
Latvia  was even less optimistic — a 1,5 times decrease in the country’s 
economic growth. The European Commission believes that the state was too 
susceptible to external risks [22]. Moreover, Mārtiņš Zemītis, an economic 
expert of the European Commission Representation in Latvia, stressed in 
May 2015 that, in 2016, the country had to undertake fiscal consolidation of 
0.3 % of GDP. In his opinion, the European Commission did not object to 
Latvia’s plans to increase defence spending and carry out reforms in 
healthcare. The country should not have spent more than it could afford. 
‘The European Commission is not sure that Latvia has enough money to 
cover all these sectors’ [23]. 
What were the causes of the 2009 dramatic decline? In our opinion, it is 
a consequence of the hypertrophied development of several sectors of the 
economy — the financial sector, real estate, and trade. Economists are famil-
iar with the phenomenon of speculative economic growth, which is not 
backed by the development of real economy. 
Today, the banking sector of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia is dominated 
by Nordic transnational financial corporations. This structure of the banking 
sector is a trendsetter in the Baltic economies. The identification of priority 
areas for lending makes it possible to stimulate industries that do not com-
pete with the parent organisation’s capital. 
Experts are becoming increasingly aware of a disruption of the nor-
mal course of the Baltics’ economic development. If earlier we spoke 
about a dialectical interaction between the economy and politics, today 
the economy has become subordinate to politics. The golden age of Eu-
ropean economy (the 1950s — the first seven years of the XXI century) 
came to its end. Europe will not grow at a rate of 3—5 % per year for 
many years to come until the paradigm of political and economic devel-
opment changes. This means that, regardless of the forms of support for 
the economies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the European Union will 
not and cannot ensure economic development and can only secure the al-
ready achieved level.  
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3. Industrial and innovation policy 
 
Today, it is difficult to imagine that Riga was one of the largest indus-
trial centres of the European part of the Russian Empire alongside Warsaw, 
Kyiv, and Kharkov. Riga specialised in high-tech industries. It had a sig-
nificant proportion of companies with foreign capital, surpassed only by 
the capital of the empire. During the interbellum, mechanical engineering 
was not rapidly developing in Latvia. Yet, it did not disappear. K. Ulma-
nis’s authoritarian regime maintained the industrial achievements and con-
tributed to the development of the transport and energy sectors. At the 
same time, industrial production almost disappeared in Estonia and did not 
exist in Lithuania at all. As it was mentioned above, the USSR launched 
modern industrial production in the Baltics based on economic considera-
tions — to cut costs. 
Former industrial giants of the Latvian SSR — Riga factories RAF, 
VEF, Radiotehnika, Alfa, Daugavpils chemical fibre plant — were privat-
ised and driven to bankruptcy in the 1990s. The Riga railroad-car, Liepaja 
metallurgical, and Daugavpils locomotive maintenance factories were more 
successful. However, the new vector of industrial politics did not leave much 
room for further development. In 1990, Riga railroad car factory was la-
belled an unnecessary appendage to the Soviet economy. Therefore, bank-
ruptcy conditions were created for the factory in 2013. An attempt to find an 
effective investor failed in 2015. The debate taking place in the expert com-
munity showed that the investor is interested in potential markets of at least 
Russian scale. The Russo-Balt car manufacturer was supported by foreign 
capital. However, it assembled cars for the whole market of Russia. The Ri-
ga railroad car factory cannot be attractive for investors as a company of the 
Latvian or even European market. The brand of the Latvian Republic, the 
only large industrial company that does not show any signs of a systemic cri-
sis is Latvijas balzams. It employes 600 people, being one of the largest Lat-
vian exporters, whose produce is sold in over 30 countries of the world and 
this figure grows every year [24]. 
The results of deindustrialisation are evident. Therefore, let us consider 
its causes. Firstly, a post-industrial (postmodern) society using knowledge 
and global electronic technologies as the main development resource can 
emerge only in a modern developed economy. Germany followed this path. 
Moreover, a certain controlled reduction in industrial production in favour of 
services is a sign of the approaching ‘new economy’. A vivid example is 
controlled deindustrialisation in the USA. 
Secondly, ‘what the Nordic economies were extremely good at during 
the post-war period, and still are, was  hedging or socializing risks for long-
term R&D, innovation and industrial upgrading while the Baltic economies 
of the 1990s and 2000s hedged or socialized risks for short-term consump-
tion and asset booms. The former learned to manage financial fragility and 
long-term growth; the latter have no options left to manage enormous fragili-
ty brought into the system by short-term rapid growth’ [25]. 
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Thirdly, the emphasis on deindustrialisation had a double political sub-
text. As a rule, workers at large and medium companies of the Baltics did 
not belong to the Baltic nations. They were organised on the social and in-
dustrial basis. Therefore, destruction of industrial production was not an 
economic, but a political objective. Further, the liberal project would inevi-
tably encounter resistance from supporters of the concept of social state pop-
ular in Germany and the Nordic countries. Violent suppression of trade un-
ions used by Latin American right-wing dictatorship was not acceptable, 
whereas liberalisation accompanied by the gradual closing of Eastern mar-
kets yielded the desired political effect. 
Today, having faced the mentioned phenomenon, regional societies and 
states are looking for new, non-standard ways for the Baltics’ participation 
in the international division of labour [26; 27]. Regardless of the results, it is 
evident that, having destroyed industrial production (and agriculture), Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not become contemporary post-industrial 
countries. Industrial civilisation will exist even when the utopic experiment 
of self-regulating market becomes a scary memory [28]. The positioning of 
the Baltics in this civilisation is questionable. 
 
4. Foreign economic aspect of the post-Soviet transformation 
in the Baltic States 
 
As it was mentioned above, in the beginning, the leaders of Soviet Bal-
tic republics and, later, independent Baltic States were very cautious when 
speaking of the prospects of economic development; they stressed the need 
to retain economic ties with Russia. The objective of transit potential de-
velopment was set. And until 2004—2007, it was more or less successfully 
implemented. ‘The transit potential of a country is a total of external and 
internal factors shaping a country’s opportunities for handling international 
cargo and passenger transit without applying the measures of state eco-
nomic policy to transport objects’ [29, p. 94]. The academician of the Es-
tonian Academy of Sciences, Prof. M. L. Bronstein wrote, ‘Transit, being 
the most rapidly developing industry, accounted for 10—12 % of Estonia’s 
GDP in the 1990s, this figure increasing when financial and logistic ser-
vices are taken into account’. 
The significance of transit for the Baltic States’ economy has always 
been widely debated. However, it is a solid fact that, in the late 1990s — ear-
ly 2000s, this and the associated industries accounted for 20 % of GDP [30]. 
This figure does not take into account the transport sector proper. Otherwise, 
it would be higher. The Baltic States’ accession to the EU could have con-
tributed to the development of trade and transit. However, the supposition 
that ‘the accession of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to the European Union 
has provided fertile ground for further development of trade and economic 
relations’ [31, p. 122], as expected, proved to be unreasonable. In the 21st 
century, the concept of transit policy is impossible without assessing the po-
litical climate. A sign of the political component in action is that the Baltic 
ports handled 53,239 million tons of cargo in 2015, which is 3,638 tons 
(6.4 %) below the 2014 level [32]. 
Economics 
 
30 
According to Bloomberg, in 2015, Russian exports to the Baltic States 
decreased by approximately one fifth due to the sanctions. Danske Bank pre-
dicted an 18—25 % reduction in exports, which would entail 690 million 
losses for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; exports to Russia account for 6.3 % 
of all exports in Latvia, 4.4 % in Lithuania, and  5.5 % in Estonia. A reduc-
tion in exports is caused by the plummeting rouble and recession in Russia. 
Bloomberg’s experts predicted the development of the Baltics’ economies at 
a rate of 1.3—1.7 % in 2015, which is lower than expected earlier [33]. 
Another important aspect is re-export. In 2014, total Lithuanian exports 
to Russia accounted for 2.5 billion litas, whereas the cost of goods re-ex-
ported from other countries was six times this level, exceeding 14 billion li-
tas [34]. 
The objective of strengthening economic ties with other countries has 
been declared by the President of Latvia [35]. However, Adviser to 
the President of the Republic of Latvia on European and Economic Affairs 
disavowed the position of the President, who was about to leave the office, 
stressed that the idea of a ‘bridge’ between the West and the East had to be 
abandoned [36]. The implementation of this idea will affect the general sta-
bility of the Baltics’ economy. 
Of course, it will also have a certain effect on Russia. Another important 
factor is the disconnection of the Baltics’ energy system from Russia. This 
means that Russia will have to launch additional generating capacities in 
some of its western regions. Since power transmission lines ran through the 
Baltics to certain Russian regions and vice versa and they will be reoriented 
to Europe, Russia will have to build new electricity lines to ensure power 
transmission. This will cost approximately 2—2.5 billion euros [37]. How-
ever, the cost to the Baltics (more precisely, the European Union) will be 
much higher. It is worth stressing that Finland does not only buy power from 
Russia, but also sells it to Russia for mutual benefit [38]. 
In the context of foreign economic ties and their role in the economy, it is 
important to consider the role of tourism. The Baltics and Transcaucasian 
countries top the list of the most affordable tourist destinations for Russians. 
However, the tourist flow from Russia to Estonia reduced almost twofold [39]. 
Based on the above and the ambitious project of the Baltics in the fields 
of transport and energy [40], it can be concluded that Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania will take every effort to undermine the remainder of their econom-
ic sovereignty. 
It is also worth stressing that one of the key problems of the Baltics is 
the lack of a development strategy for the period after 2004. Strategic tar-
gets were lost after the accession to the EU, which was considered the ul-
timate goal. 
 
5. Financial and economic relations with the European Union 
 
When considering the economic prospects of the Baltic States, it can be 
argued that these countries have fully benefitted from the European inte-
gration. 
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A comparison of the transfers from the Baltics to the EU budget and 
vice versa in 2000—2011 shows that the funds were managed most suc-
cessfully by Lithuania, even if the EU support for the closing of the Ig-
nalina NPP is not taken into account. Lithuanians receive 4.4 euros, Latvi-
ans — 3.7 euros, and Estonians — 3.4 euros for each euro transferred to 
the EU budget. However, as to EU support per capita, Estonia ranks first 
with 2.72 euros per person, followed by Lithuania — 2.68 euros, and Lat-
via — 2.17 euros [41]. 
There is, however, a risk that the inflow of external funds will turn 
out to be a Pyrrhic victory… Often investment decisions are made ac-
cording to “opportunities” offered by the various EU programmes, rather 
than according to the “needs” of society in general. With the contractor, 
not having to pay the full cost from his or her own budget, there is a clear 
incentive to overinvestment. There are multiple examples of large con-
struction works undertaken without paying due regard to the actual needs 
of the beneficiaries or even the ability to pay for the running cost in the 
long term [42, p. 13]. 
Over the recent years, the Baltics’ governments have formulated three 
priorities during their negotiations over subsidies to their national budgets:  
1) a stronger support from the Cohesion Fund; 
2) an increase in subsidies to farmers within the Common Agricultural 
Policy; 
3) financing of the Rail Baltica project within the Connecting Europe 
Facility [43]. 
Counting on the EU assistance is a key factor behind the current policies 
of the Baltics. However, the economic prospects of the EU in general are al-
so unclear. Today, the EU-Baltic infrastructural projects require expenditure 
comparable to that provided for in the 1950—1980s by the Soviet Union. 
The difference is that, in that period, return on investment was ensured by 
the three-hundred-million Soviet market. Today, the EU does not have an 
opportunity to finance such projects, nor does it have the desire to inform 
Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius about it. 
EU subsidies account for 75—90 % of investment in the public sector. If 
we assume that Estonia’s national budget equals 100 units, 76 units (pen-
sions, benefits, etc.) will be regulated by laws. The remaining 24 units are 
the part of budget that can be discussed by the Parliament. Over the recent 
years, the EU has accounted for 16—18 % of Estonia’s budget [44]. The Bal-
tic economic model survives and will survive with the support from the EU. 
The system does not generate a steady inflow of funds on its own. 
 
6. Economic framework for social policy 
 
The Baltics’ social policy is based on abandoning the concept of social 
state suggesting a contract between the state and the civil society, in particu-
lar, between the state, employers, trade unions, associations, and NGOs. In 
practice, this means a change and a dramatic reduction in the initially devel-
oped system of social security and social guarantees and healthcare commer-
cialisation. 
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Changes in the economic structure did not increase productivity at the 
expected rate; they curb opportunities for solving the country’s social prob-
lems. Estonia’s social security spending per capita accounts for 40 % of the 
EU’s average. The social alienation rate has not decreased in Estonia over 
the past decade. Every fourth Estonian is in the at-risk group [45]. 
Swedbank has analysed the expenditure of residents of Tallinn, Riga, and 
Vilnius on food and housing. The analysis shows that in Riga, a family of 
four living in their own 70 m2 flat spends 44 % of the family’s income on 
food, housing, and transport, in Vilnius  — 41.5 %, and 25.5 % in Tallinn. 
A family consisting of two adults and two children spends 591 euros a 
month on food, housing, and public transportation in Riga, in Vilnius — 
513 euros, and 499 euros in Tallinn [46]. LETA, referring to the data of Lat-
via’s Central Statistical Bureau, stresses that, in the first quarter of 2015, Es-
tonians received the highest (1010 euros) and Lithuanians the lowest 
(700 euros) salary across the Baltics. In Latvia, gross salary reached 786 eu-
ros in that period. As compared to the first quarter of 2014, the highest in-
crease rate was observed in Latvia with 6.1 %. In Estonia and Latvia, salaries 
increased at the rates of 4.5 % and 4.3 % respectively. However, after taxa-
tion, Latvian salaries are lower than those in the neighbouring countries. An 
average net salary in Latvia accounted for 74 % of gross salary, in Lithua-
nia —   78 %, and in Estonia  — 81 % [47]. 
 
7. Political obstacles to economic transformations and modernisation 
 
Extreme politicisation of economic development — which is more pro-
nounced in the Baltic States than anywhere across the post-Soviet space — 
is a characteristic feature of the countries’ economic regime. In Estonia and 
Latvia, the economic mythology has become part of politics, a standard of 
public administration. Complicated economic processes are explained 
through simple political slogans and criticism of earlier economic practices. 
The ‘reserves’ of economic politicisation were sufficient for almost twenty 
years. However, ‘at the moment, an increasing number of people pay atten-
tion to concrete results of a policy rather than its ideological bases’ [48, 
p. 211]. Society demands Western standards of living, which are not ob-
served in the Baltics. 
David Woodruff, an associate professor of political science in the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, argues with the authoritative economist 
Mancur Olson: 
Is it too much to speculate that democracy’s success has been that it aids 
in the design of locally appropriate policies, the policies that take for granted 
that dynamiting inherited industries is unlikely to be the best course, and 
grapple with such unobvious issues as how best to promote the adaptation of 
socialist enterprises to market conditions? [49, с. 216]. 
Only 25% of Latvians, 25% of Lithuanians, and 22% of Estonians ‘part-
ly agree’ that their voice is heard in the EU (as compare to the EU average of 
33 %). At the same time, 32 % of Latvians, 16 % of Lithuanians, and 53 % of 
Estonians ‘partly agree’ that their voice is heart in the own states (the EU 
average is 52%) [50]. 
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*    *    * 
 
It can be concluded that the Baltic States have undergone two stages of 
transformation. The first one took place in 1990—2004, when the objectives 
of the key structural reforms were achieved. The accession of the Baltic 
States to the EU confirmed this thesis. With certain reservations, this period 
can be interpreted as a part of the modernisation project. However, the basis 
for the development of the economic model, functioning as a privileged pe-
riphery of the EU, was established at the time. 
At the second stage, the Baltics unsuccessfully tried to overcome their 
periphery position following the catch-up development pattern. Yet, despite 
all efforts, they remain a periphery zone of the decelerating modernisation 
process, whose centre is located in Western Europe. Of course, the function-
ing of the centre would be impossible without periphery, thus the centre cre-
ated periphery in the course of its evolution. 
A vast array of empirical data, a creative generalisation of Russian and 
international economic theories, and Russian experience make it possible for 
economic and political scientists to develop concepts based on a new model 
of studying transformation in the Baltics. Firstly, it uses comparative meth-
ods of transitology. Secondly, the model acknowledges the fact that the peri-
od, when Russian science used primarily linear-progressive concepts of post-
Soviet transformations, has ended. Relatively market-oriented and relatively 
democratic political systems have developed in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia. These stages of transformation were almost identical in the Baltics and 
in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the year of 2004 saw the beginning 
of a new stage of post-Soviet transformations, whose results are not yet 
known and, in many cases, are difficult to predict. 
There is another important aspect. Despite ritual incantations of euroin-
tegration, it turned out to be very different from basic European values and 
priorities having evolved within the paradigm created by Amnglo-Saxon ne-
oconservatives in the 1980s. The very foundations of European economic 
policy suggest close regulation associated with the idea of a welfare state. 
Current orientation to the tertiary sector requires centuries of industrial de-
velopment and protectionism towards national industrial production. In Eu-
rope, a successful economic policy suggests political pluralism and peaceful 
transfer of power, which is not the case in the Baltics. For instance, right-
wing parties have been in power in Estonia for a decade and a half, whereas 
the opposition is formed not by leftists (the part of political spectrum is ab-
sent in the country) but by centrists led by Edgar Savisaar — the ‘father’ of 
Estonian economic reforms. 
It can be concluded that the post-Soviet transformation in the Baltic 
States has been finished. The current economic model can be described as 
liberal Anglo-Saxon. However, the classical liberal economic model sug-
gests freedom of markets in all geographical and economic directions, which 
is not the case in the Baltics. 
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